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Abstract
This paper reports a large-scale study that aims to understand how
mobile application (app) vulnerabilities are associated with software li-
braries. We analyze both free and paid apps. Studying paid apps was quite
meaningful because it helped us understand how differences in app devel-
opment/maintenance affect the vulnerabilities associated with libraries.
We analyzed 30k free and paid apps collected from the official Android
marketplace. Our extensive analyses revealed that approximately 70%/50%
of vulnerabilities of free/paid apps stem from software libraries, particu-
larly from third-party libraries. Somewhat paradoxically, we found that
more expensive/popular paid apps tend to have more vulnerabilities. This
comes from the fact that more expensive/popular paid apps tend to have
more functionality, i.e., more code and libraries, which increases the prob-
ability of vulnerabilities. Based on our findings, we provide suggestions
to stakeholders of mobile app distribution ecosystems.
1 Introduction
Software libraries play a vital role in the development of modern mobile applica-
tions (app). They enable developers to improve development efficiency and app
quality. In fact, Wang et al. reported that more than 60% of sub-packages in An-
droid apps originate from third-party libraries [40]. Although software libraries
offer many advantages, in some cases, they could be the source of security prob-
lems, e.g., vulnerabilities or potentially harmful functionalities. Chen et al. [12]
recently reported that 6.84% of apps published to Google Play were potentially
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harmful apps associated with harmful software libraries. These observations
indicate that libraries can be the origins of the mobile app vulnerabilities.
We report a large-scale study to understand how mobile app vulnerabilities
are associated with software libraries. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first study that uses large datasets to systematically quantify the vulner-
abilities associated with libraries. To perform our analysis, we developed two
frameworks, Droid-L and Droid-V, to detect/classify software libraries used in
mobile apps and quantify how vulnerable mobile app libraries are, respectively.
By linking the output of the two frameworks, we can specify the mobile app
vulnerabilities associated with libraries. As the number of active mobile apps
published in prominent mobile app marketplaces has exceeded four million [37],
using a small sample of apps may result in intrinsic bias. However, analyzing
all available mobile apps is not feasible. Thus, we applied proper sampling ap-
proaches to generate a dataset that is sufficient to extract statistically reliable
results. We adopted two sampling approaches, i.e., top-K relative to the num-
ber of installs and random sampling. Top-K reflects the most influential apps
and random sampling reflects the statistics of each population.
A unique and noteworthy approach of this study is that we analyze both
free and paid apps. Very few studies have investigated the security of paid
apps. We employ a relatively large number of paid apps to ensure statistically
reliable results. Studying paid apps enables us to understand how differences
in the development/maintenance of apps affect vulnerabilities associated with
libraries. We examined software updates for these apps six months after they
were originally collected. We collected 2M free apps to construct a database
(DB) to detect/classify the libraries used in apps. In total, we used 2M free
apps and 30K paid apps for our analyses.
Our primary findings are as follows.
• Roughly 70% of free apps and roughly 50% of paid apps with vulnerabil-
ities were vulnerable due to libraries.
• More expensive/popular paid apps tend to have more vulnerabilities than
other paid apps.
• Paid apps tend to have not been updated for longer periods than the free
apps; thus, vulnerable libraries in paid apps have not been updated for
longer periods than the free apps.
• Approximately one-half of the vulnerabilities detected by existing vulner-
ability checking tools are found in unreachable code.
Based on these findings, we derive suggestions for stakeholders in mobile app
distribution ecosystems (Section 6.4).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present
a high-level overview of the methodologies developed for our analysis. In Sec-
tions 3 and 4, we describe the Droid-L and Droid-V frameworks, respectively.
In Section 5, we characterize the dataset used for the analysis. Findings are
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Figure 1: High-level overview of methodologies
presented in Section 6. Limitations of the analysis and future research direc-
tions are discussed in Section 7. We also consider ethical issues associated with
this research in Section 7. Section 8 provides a summary of related work, and
conclusions are presented in Section 9.
2 Overview of Methodologies
Figure 1 presents a high-level overview of our approach, which consists of the
Droid-L and Droid-V frameworks. Droid-L automatically detects/classifies soft-
ware libraries used in mobile apps. It first extracts packages from a given APK
file. In the Android OS, a package organizes multiple classes; thus, it represents
the smallest unit of a software library. The package technique is used to provide
modular programming in Java, which is a primary programming language for
Android app development. Droid-L then classifies the extracted libraries into
three primary categories. Droid-V is a compilation system that measures the
degree of vulnerability of mobile app libraries. For a given APK file, we use
five vulnerability checkers to detect vulnerabilities and specify Java classes and
package names associated with the detected vulnerabilities. Finally, by linking
Droid-L and Droid-V outputs, we can detect vulnerable libraries for a given
APK file.
In the following sections, we describe Droid-L and Droid-V, and we discuss
threats to the validity of each framework.
3 Droid-L: Library detector
The Droid-L system detects and classifies software libraries. Figure 2 shows an
overview of the Droid-L system, which comprises a fingerprint DB and a dead
code checker. For a given APK file, the system first decompiles the file and
extracts packages. The system then computes a fingerprint for each package
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Figure 2: Overview of Droid-L.
and compares the computed fingerprints to the library fingerprint DB, which
we describe in the next section. The fingerprint DB returns one of three library
categories, i.e., official, private, or third-party. If the DB does not return any-
thing, this implies that the package is not a library. Next, the system applies
the dead code checker to the extracted libraries. The dead code checker employs
static call graph analysis to determine if the detected library code is dead code.
In the following, we describe these two components in detail.
3.1 Building the fingerprint DB
As shown in Fig. 2, the role of the fingerprint DB is to classify a given package
as official, private, or third-party (Section 3.1.2). To build such a DB, we take
the following two-stage approach. First, we employ cluster analysis to extract
a set of packages with similar characteristics, which we call a fingerprint. A
fingerprint is a unique signature that represents an extracted cluster. Then,
we classify the extracted clusters using two heuristics The first heuristic is the
naming convention of Java packages. Each package has an intrinsic name that
may suggest which category it should belong to. For example, com.google.ads
represents the AdSense library supported by the official Android SDK manager.
The second heuristic is the number of distinct developer certificates per cluster.
This feature is useful to determine how a detected library is used by developers.
If it is a widely used public library, we will find many distinct certificates for
apps that use the given library; if it is used by a single developer, the library is
likely a private library.
Once we build a library fingerprint using a large collection of apps, we can
extract software libraries and classify them into categories for a given app. Note
that we assume that code other than the detected software libraries is attributed
to app developers. We discuss the limitation of this assumption in Section 3.3.
3.1.1 Clustering packages
To detect libraries contained in the collected apps, we begin by clustering pack-
ages. Similar packages used in many apps are clustered. A set of clustered
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packages possibly represents a software library. There are several ways to clus-
ter packages [29, 40, 12]. LibRadar [29] leverages stable API features that are
resilient to code obfuscation or minor software updates. LibFinder [12] compares
two packages at the method level using control flow graphs.
Due to its simplicity and high scalability, we adopted the approach used in
LibRadar as our base and extended it for our purpose. Note that we could adopt
other clustering approaches, such as LibFinder or other clustering algorithms
using features extracted from packages.
Following the LibRadar approach, we first extract packages for the given
apps. Here let p be an extracted package. Next, for each p, we derive n(p), which
is the total number of API calls in p, and m(p), which is the number of distinct
API calls used in p. Finally, for a given package p, we compute its fingerprint
F (p): F (p) = h(n(p),m(p)), where h() is a lightweight hash function. After
processing all packages found in all apps, packages with the same fingerprint
are clustered. We eliminate a cluster if it has only one package.
From the set of all package names found in a cluster, we choose the most
frequently used name as the representative package name (RPN). The RPN of-
fers a human-interpretable representation of a cluster while removing the noise
introduced by developers who modify the names of packages. While extracting
RPNs is common with LibRadar, the method we use to extract RPNs may not
be identical because not all details are disclosed in Ref. [29] and in its open-
source tool [25]. We also apply deobfuscation to package names by heuristically
identifying and removing obfuscated package names (e.g., zzz.a.b.c) before
choosing the RPN. The deobfuscation is described in detail in Appendix, Sec-
tion A.
The extracted RPNs are useful for understanding the provenance of libraries.
We use the RPNs to classify detected libraries into categories.
3.1.2 Library classification
We aim to classify detected software libraries. Note that existing library detec-
tion schemes [29, 40, 12] have not considered such classification. We define three
library categories, i.e., official, private, and third-party, based on how they are
distributed. This distinction is particularly important in relation to suggestions
for managing libraries in the presence of vulnerabilities. We use RPNs and the
number of distinct certificates per library for the classification task.
The descriptions of the three categories of libraries and the ways to detect
them are summarized below:
Official Libraries are those supported by the official Android SDK Manager
[2], e.g., the Android Support Library. Detected if its RPN matches one of the
package names provided by the SDK Manager ,e.g., android.support.
Private Libraries are those developed by a particular developer intended only
to be used privately in apps developed by that developer, e.g., special log-
ging/debugging libraries. Detected if all apps using the library are signed with
a single signature.
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Third-Party Libraries are those distributed freely or commercially to be used
by any developers, e.g., an advertisement library. Detected if it is not classified
as an official library or a private library.
We also listed examples of RPNs for each categories in Table 12 in Appendix.
Next, we classify third-party libraries into sub-categories that describe their
functionality or purpose. We considered 8 sub-categories: Ad (Advertisement),
Analyt (Mobile analytics), Build (App building framework), Cloud (Cloud-based
app building), Dev (Development aid), Game (Game engines), Pymt (Payment),
and SNS (Social networks). We also listed examples of RPNs for each sub-
categories in Table 13 in Appendix. Our task is to assign a detected library/RPN
to one of the categories.
First, we compile a list of package names that are associated with popular
third-party libraries listed in websites such as [6]. Let the compiled list be “list
A.” Second, for RPNs that are not detected in list A, we manually inspect
the top package names used for at least 100 distinct apps. We summarize the
results as “list B.” Finally, for libraries not covered by lists A and B, we apply
the following prefix-matching heuristics. For a given unclassified RPN C, if
there is a classified RPN D that matches a prefix of C, then C is assigned the
same category as D.
Finally, using the procedures described above, we construct a fingerprint DB.
Each record consists of the following three-tuple, i.e., fingerprint, deobfuscated
RPN, and class/category. The fingerprint DB is employed as follows. We extract
packages from a given APK file and compute a fingerprint for each package.
By querying the obtained fingerprints in the DB, we can obtain corresponding
deobfuscated RPNs and categories. Note that an APK file may contain code
from multiple libraries in the same category, e.g., it is quite common that an
app uses more than two distinct ad libraries.
3.2 Dead code checker
Since some detected vulnerabilities may reside in dead code, we must distin-
guish such cases from legitimate cases. Thus, we built a dead code checker
that can determine whether a given class is reachable in a generated function
call tree. If all classes within a detected library are not reachable, we conclude
that the detected library is dead code. The dead code checker is described in
detail in Appendix, Section C. Note that our approach has an intrinsic limi-
tation associated with static code analysis. This will be discussed in the next
subsection.
3.3 Threats to validity
3.3.1 Accuracy of results
To validate the accuracy of the results generated by the Droid-L system, we
inspected the detected libraries manually. We randomly sampled 25 apps from
each of four datasets, i.e., free top, free random, paid top, and paid random
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apps. We summarize the dataset in Section 5.1. These 100 apps contained
11,633 packages, which were grouped into 7,620 distinct clusters, and 85% of
the clusters (6,460) were detected as libraries using the fingerprint DB. The
remaining packages (1,160) were not detected as libraries for the following rea-
sons. First, the fingerprints of those libraries have been changed due to software
updates. Second, some libraries use code optimization tools, such as ProGuard,
which could also change fingerprints. We then inspected the 6,460 packages
manually. First, we disassembled/decompiled the APK files. Then, we looked
at the detected packages and inspected the classes/methods within the pack-
ages. We also searched the origins of the package source code using Internet
search engines. We found that 6,308 packages (97.6%) were classified correctly.
This result clearly validates the accuracy of the Droid-L system.
3.3.2 Dead code checker
Static analysis, which is the basis of our approach, has the following two limita-
tions. First, although the algorithm can exclude dead code, we cannot precisely
ensure that remaining code is actually used in the app. Second, static code
analysis cannot dynamically track assigned program code at run time, such as
reflection. These limitations are common among static analysis approaches.
4 Droid-V: Vulnerability checker
Our next goal is to identify vulnerabilities in detected libraries. To this end,
we built a vulnerability checker, i.e., Droid-V, which uses various vulnerability
scanners and compiles their results for further analysis. Taking an app as input,
Droid-V detects the presence of vulnerabilities and identifies where in the code
the vulnerabilities reside. This information can be combined with the results of
Droid-L to identify the responsible libraries. In this section, we list and describe
the vulnerabilities we targeted. Some of the limitations of our system are also
discussed.
4.1 Vulnerabilities
As summarized in Section 8, common and influential vulnerabilities found in
recent mobile platforms can be broadly classified into four categories, i.e., infor-
mation disclosure, SSL/TLS and cryptography, inter-component communication
(ICC), and WebView. While the first two are underlying for all softwares, not
just mobile apps and devices, the last two are mobile app/device-specific issues.
Each of these vulnerability categories has the following implications. Infor-
mation disclosure involves the inclusion or improper access control of sensitive
information that may lead to undesired leakage. Cryptography involves the
misuse of SSL/TLS and cryptographic-related code, which may lead to crypto-
graphic integrity being compromised. ICC involves improper permissions that
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Table 1: List of checked vulnerabilities
ID Descriptions
Information Disclosure
ID-GLOB Writes data to globally accessible area
ID-STOK Contains secret token
ID-FGMT Fragment injection vulnerability
SSL/TLS and Cryptography
CR-KSPW SSL keystore is not password-protected
CR-KSHC SSL keystore is hard-coded
CR-SSLV Miscellaneous SSL validation flaws
CR-CERT Contains weak certificate
CR-ECBM ECB mode encryption is used
CR-PKEY Contains private key
Inter-Component Communication
IC-CPRV ContentProvider without export attribute
IC-SRVC Service with intent filter
IC-DNGR Declares “dangerous” level permission
IC-EXPT Export attribute is missing “android:” prefix
IC-DEBG Debuggable flag is manually set to true
WebView
WV-SSLV WebView does not validate SSL
WV-RCEV WebView RCE vulnerability
WV-FSYS File system access is enabled in WebView
WV-DOMS DOM storage is enabled in WebView
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may allow another app to access an app’s sensitive information. WebView in-
volves the misuse of Android’s WebView class, which has been a source of many
vulnerabilities, including remote code execution.
Table 1 lists the vulnerabilities we tested. We scanned our dataset for a total
of 18 types of vulnerabilities using 2 original tools (Weak Certificate Checker and
Secret Token Finder) and 3 open source tools (AndroBugs [1], MalloDroid [3],
and QARK [27]). The tools are summarized in Section D of the Appendix.
4.2 Threats to validity
Similar to the Droid-L system, Droid-V employs static code analysis to perform
a large-scale study. Clearly, static code analysis may not be able to track dy-
namically assigned program code. Poeplau et al. [34] reported that malicious
apps using dynamic code loading techniques can evade detection using offline
vetting processes, e.g., static analysis, anti-virus scanning, or dynamic analysis
in a sandbox without Internet connectivity. A malicious app can contain only
the minimal functionality sufficient to circumvent the vetting process on Google
Play, i.e., Bouncer [28]. The malicious code is downloaded only after the app
is installed on a device. Dynamic code loading is an obstacle to vulnerabil-
ity assessment for external code for non-malicious apps. Employing dynamic
code analysis with Internet connectivity could be a promising solution to this
problem. However, dynamic code analysis has several technical challenges, i.e.,
scalability, measuring and improving code coverage, and generating a test sce-
nario for UI navigation [30]. We intend to address these challenges in future
work.
5 Data
This section describes the free and paid app datasets used in our analysis. Since
there have been no studies that analyzed paid mobile apps on a large scale, it
would be meaningful to present how they are different from free apps. As
discussed later, paid apps exhibit different characteristics compared to free apps.
We construe that this reflects differences in app development and maintenance
processes. We first provide an overview of datasets and then present interesting
findings derived through an analysis of paid/free apps and the corresponding
metadata, such as the prices of paid apps and the number of installs.
5.1 Data description
We collected paid and free Android apps available on Google Play [2]. We
collected and used Android apps for two purposes. The first purpose was to
generate the fingerprint DB (Section 3.1). To this end, we collected 2M free
apps and 30K paid apps from Google Play. Table 2 summarizes the data col-
lected to generate the fingerprint DB. The second purpose was to analyze the
vulnerabilities of the libraries. Collecting and analyzing all paid and free apps
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Table 2: Data for building fingerprint DB
Source # of APK files Date
Free 1,495,745 Nov 2014
Free 461,594 Jun–Jul 2016
Paid 30,000 Jan 2016
Table 3: Statistics of prices of paid apps (USD)
Top-5k Rand-10k
mean 3.44 3.30
standard deviation 4.09 8.90
median 2.40 1.51
min 0.99 0.99
max 81.67 200.0
on Google Play was not feasible due to budgetary and labor costs; thus, we
made use of filtration and sampling as follows. First, we compiled lists of paid
and free apps published on Google Play. From each list, we selected both the
top-K and randomly sampled apps. The selected apps were divided into four
sets, i.e., paid top, paid random, free top, and free random apps. The top-K
apps represent the most influential apps, and the randomly sampled apps reflect
the statistics of each population. We used the top-5k and random-10k (rand-
10k) apps for our analysis. In total, we 30k apps were used in our analyses.
To further investigate the changes of vulnerabilities of apps/libraries over time,
we updated these apps six months after we first collected them. Results for
updated apps are presented in Section 6.3.
5.2 Characteristics of free/paid apps
In the following analyses, we attempt to characterize the collected data. The
derived characteristics are useful to understand the sources and impacts of vul-
nerabilities associated with libraries. In other words, we investigate the number
of installs, prices, and number of classes.
5.2.1 Number of installs
Figure 3 shows the cumulative distribution function of the number of installs per
application. Note that these numbers were discretized into logarithmic ranges.
Generally, free apps demonstrate a larger number of installs than paid apps.
Approximately 60% of randomly sampled paid apps show fewer than 10 − 50
installs, and approximately 60% of randomly sampled free apps show fewer than
500− 1000 installs. This tendency also applies to the top apps.
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5.2.2 Prices
In this study, we are interested in how prices correlates to vulnerabilities. It is
known that customers use price-perceived quality heuristics [26] when appraising
the quality of a product or service. It is natural to assume that such perception
might reflect expectations regarding security risks. In other words, customers
may believe that a paid app has fewer security risks than a free app. After
analyzing the vulnerabilities of paid mobile apps in the next section, we return
to this issue in Section 7.
Table 3 summarizes the price statistics for the top and randomly sampled
paid apps. Generally, the prices of the top apps were slightly higher than those
of randomly sampled apps. In addition, among random paid apps, several apps
had the maximum price that can be set, i.e., 200 USD. We investigated such
apps and found that most were a type of joke app, such as the “I am rich” app,
which does not have any practical function.
5.2.3 Time of last update
We look into the time of the last update, which represents whether a particular
app is actively developed/maintained. This information is useful for predicting
the security awareness of a developer. For instance, if an app has not been
updated for a long time, it may have more security risks than apps with recent
updates. Ideally, it is good to use the full history of updates to measure the
average time between updates. However, such information is not accessible from
the web interface of the official market. As a substitute, we made use of the
last date an app received an update. Although the last update date is more
coarse-grained than the full history of updates, it gives us useful information
about an app’s development activity.
Figure 4 shows the distributions of the last update date for each class of apps.
Usually, we may expect that top apps tend to have a more recent last update
date than randomly sampled apps for both free and paid classes. However, it
is somewhat surprising that the top paid apps tend to have not been updated
for longer periods than the random free apps. As presented in Section 5.2.1, we
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consider that this originates from the fact that paid apps tend to have a lower
number of installs, i.e., the higher the number of users, the more app updates. In
addition, this tendency may reflect the “sell-once-and-that’s-it” model of some
paid apps.
5.2.4 Number of classes
Figure 5 shows the distributions of the number of classes per app. We find
two general observations here. First, free apps have a larger number of classes.
Second, top apps also have a larger number of classes. These observations
suggest that top and free apps tend to have more functionality than random
apps. As discussed in the next section, it is interesting that, for paid apps,
the prices and numbers of classes exhibit a positive correlation, i.e., the more
expensive an app is, the more classes (functionalities) the app has.
6 Analysis results
This section describes the results we obtained through extensive analysis of
the datasets. We first present the software libraries detected using the Droid-
L system (Section 6.1). Then, we present vulnerable libraries found with the
two systems, i.e., Droid-L and Droid-V (Section 6.2). We also analyze how
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Table 4: Statistics of the number of detected libraries per app.
Datasets mean std max min
Free (Top-5k) 10.67 9.39 101 0
Free (Rand-10k) 6.09 7.40 66 0
Paid (Top-5k) 4.86 6.45 69 0
Paid (Rand-10k) 3.07 5.20 74 0
Table 5: Total number of detected libraries per each category.
Category
Free Free Paid Paid
Top-5k Rand-10k Top-5k Rand-10k
Official 14,404 21,022 8,977 11,480
Private 1,477 2,067 1,094 2,018
Third-party 53,344 60,511 24,301 28,797
Table 6: Total number of detected third-party libraries per each sub-category.
Free Free Paid Paid
Top-5k Rand-10k Top-5k Rand-10k
Ad 5,453 2,629 1,122 884
Analyt 3,264 3,365 1,872 1,835
Build 269 1,575 227 1,084
Cloud 537 1,167 299 674
Dev 17,525 24,594 8,309 10,001
Game 2,592 2,419 1,620 1,736
Pymt 831 1,108 462 439
SNS 2,805 2,560 1,043 1,020
these results have changed over time (Section 6.3). Finally, we summarize the
key findings derived through the analyses. Based on the findings, we provide
several suggestions to stakeholders (Section 6.4).
6.1 Detected software libraries
Table 4 shows statistics about the number of detected libraries per app. The
results indicate two clear tendencies. First, free apps have more libraries than
paid apps. Second, top apps have more libraries than randomly sampled apps.
Note that this characteristic is similar to the one derived through the analysis
of the number of classes (Fig. 5).
Tables 5 and 6 present breakdowns of the extracted libraries per category/sub-
category. In Table 5, we see that, across all the datasets, third-party libraries
accounted for roughly 70%–80% of the detected libraries. Official libraries ac-
counted for roughly 20%–30% of the detected libraries. The number of detected
private libraries was much smaller than other categories. Next, in Table 6, we
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Figure 6: Box plot of the prices of apps vs. the numbers of libraries in the apps.
The top/bottom of the box is the first/third quartiles, and the band inside the
box is the median. Whiskers represent the lowest/highest datum within 1.5 IQR
of the first/third quartile where IQR is the difference between the first and third
quartiles. Outliers beyond the whiskers are represented with plus symbols.
see that, across all datasets, development aid (Dev) was the most dominant type
of third-party library. This observation was somewhat interesting to us because,
before we performed the analysis, we conjectured that the most dominant type
of third-party library would be advertisements. Other popular third-party li-
braries include advertisements (Ad), mobile analytics (Analyt), game engines
(Game), and social networks (SNS).
As a result of the detection, the most popular sub-categories of the detected
third-party libraries for each dataset are listed in Appendix, Table 15.
Finally, we inspect how the prices of apps and the number of libraries are
related. Figure 6 presents a box plot of the price of an app against the number
of libraries in the app. We make two interesting observations. First, the higher
the price of an app, the more libraries the app uses. Although not conclusive, we
construe that, because expensive apps tend to provide more functionality than
less expensive apps, they tend to use more libraries. Second, top apps have
more libraries than randomly sampled apps. Our interpretation of this finding
is the same as above, i.e., top apps provide more functionality than other apps.
In the next subsection, we examine how the detected libraries are associated
with vulnerabilities.
6.2 Analysis of vulnerable apps/libraries
Here, we first present the statistics for apps that contain the summarized vulner-
abilities. We then examine the libraries with vulnerabilities. We also examine
how the detected vulnerable libraries changed over a period of six months. Note
that an app could have a vulnerability contained in multiple libraries.
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Table 7: Fractions of detected vulnerabilities in dead code, Vdead, and frac-
tions of apps whose vulnerabilities originated from their libraries over all the
vulnerable apps, Vlib.
Vdead (%) Vlib (%)
Free (Top-5k) 49.7 71.2
Free (Rand-10k) 54.7 71.7
Paid (Top-5k) 40.1 45.9
Paid (Rand-10k) 52.3 52.1
6.2.1 Vulnerable apps
Figure 7 shows the distributions of the number of vulnerabilities found for each
app. Generally, while the number is less than that for free apps, paid apps
do contain many vulnerabilities. In fact, for the top paid apps, roughly 20%
contained at least three of the vulnerabilities. We also find that top apps contain
more vulnerabilities than random apps.
Table 7, Vdead shows the fractions of detected vulnerabilities that reside in
dead code. Surprisingly, approximately one-half of the vulnerabilities detected
by the five independent vulnerability checkers were attributed to dead code.
By combining the outputs of Droid-L and Droid-V, we can successfully exclude
vulnerabilities originating from dead code. Note that we exclude dead code in
the following analyses.
6.2.2 Vulnerable libraries
Here, we examine how many detected vulnerabilities were attributed to libraries.
We also assess the origins of the vulnerable libraries. Table 7, Vlib shows the
fractions of apps whose vulnerabilities originated from their libraries for all vul-
nerable apps. For free apps, of the apps that contain at least one vulnerability,
71%–72% were vulnerable due to libraries. For paid apps, the fractions were
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Table 8: Breakdown of detected vulnerabilities for each category
Total fractions (%)
# of Offi- Pri- Third Non
vulns ciai vate party libs
Free (Top-5k) 21,730 2.1 2.3 43.6 52.0
Free (Rand-10k) 15,516 1.3 6.4 59.5 32.8
Paid (Top-5k) 12,133 1.3 3.2 16.2 79.3
Paid (Rand-10k) 7,202 1.3 9.8 38.9 50.0
Table 9: Fractions of dead code in the vulnerable libraries, Dv, and in the
non-vulnerable libraries, Dn.
Dv (%) Dn (%)
Free (Top-5k) 61.1 34.9
Free (Rand-10k) 62.6 27.3
Paid (Top-5k) 71.5 19.5
Paid (Rand-10k) 66.0 24.5
a bit smaller; however, 46%–52% were vulnerable due to libraries. Thus, we
conclude that most mobile apps’ vulnerabilities originate from libraries.
Table 9 shows the breakdown of the fractions of dead code in vulnerable
and non-vulnerable libraries. The detected vulnerable libraries are more likely
to contain dead code. This observation suggests that it is crucial that static
vulnerability scanners include a dead code checking mechanism.
Table 8 shows a breakdown of the number of detected vulnerabilities for
each category. Here, the numbers indicate the total number of Java classes that
contained vulnerabilities in each set of apps. The fractions are the breakdown
of the detected libraries. Note that, while this analysis counts the total number
of vulnerabilities, the previous analysis shown in Table 7, Vlib analyzed the
fractions of apps with vulnerabilities due to their libraries. Free apps tend to
contain more vulnerabilities in their libraries than paid apps. We also note
that top apps tend to contain more vulnerabilities than random apps. These
results agree with the results for app-level containment of vulnerabilities shown
in Table 4. Note that this also agrees with the results shown in Fig. 5, i.e., more
classes/libraries lead to more vulnerabilities.
Table 10 shows a breakdown of the detected vulnerabilities. While we see
library-driven vulnerabilities spanning many vulnerabilities, they are particu-
larly concentrated for the ID-GLOB, ID-FGMT, CR-KSHC, CR-SSLV, WV-
SSLV, and WV-RCEV vulnerabilities. Examples of libraries that caused these
vulnerabilities are IronSource (CR-KSHC), Conduit App (ID-FGMT), PayPal
(CR-SSLV), Apache Cordova (WV-SSLV), and Inmobi (WV-RCEV).
The top panel of Fig. 8 shows the relationship between the library categories
and vulnerabilities. For each vulnerability, we inspected the distribution of
categories, i.e., the fractions were normalized in each row. Most vulnerabilities
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Table 10: Breakdown of detected vulnerabilities. The numbers X/Y indicate
the total number of detected libraries (X) and the fractions (percentages) for
which the vulnerabilities were due to libraries (Y ). Bold fonts indicate the
vulnerabilities that had a large impact (> 500) and were largely contributed by
libraries (> 40 %).
Vulnerability
Free Free Paid Paid
Top-5k Rand-10k Top-5k Rand-10k
ID-GLOB 2166/31 1469/46 5468/3 902/28
ID-STOK 186/10 128/71 71/23 61/57
ID-FGMT 4425/18 3168/49 2288/16 1362/31
CR-KSPW 6/33 7/71 4/75 8/12
CR-KSHC 932/60 485/78 219/44 124/54
CR-SSLV 3644/61 2733/81 1195/59 772/75
CR-CERT 0/0 1/0 0/0 6/0
CR-ECBM 0/0 0/0 6/16 9/55
CR-PKEY 72/0 81/0 217/0 217/0
IC-CPRV 237/0 151/0 164/0 161/0
IC-SRVC 1167/0 413/0 533/0 409/0
IC-DNGR 36/0 13/0 14/0 5/0
IC-EXPT 1/0 1/0 0/0 0/0
IC-DEBG 16/0 136/0 78/0 313/0
WV-SSLV 1251/60 1032/73 206/47 285/85
WV-RCEV 7586/71 5689/83 1516/63 2338/78
WV-FSYS 3/0 6/0 141/39 224/54
WV-DOMS 2/0 3/0 13/7 6/33
were attributed to third-party libraries. In addition, although the amount was
small, there are a few official libraries that contained vulnerabilities. Our manual
inspection found that these vulnerabilities were attributed to certain libraries,
such as Admob and the Google Mobile Service. Thus, they are classified as
“official.” We also found that the vulnerabilities were due to the use of older
versions of libraries in which the vulnerabilities had not been fixed.
Finally, the bottom panel of Fig. 8 shows the relationship between third-
party library sub-categories and vulnerabilities. Among the sub-categories, De-
velopment Aid (Dev), Social Network (SNS), Advertisement (Ad), and App
building framework (Build) were the main origins of the vulnerabilities. In ad-
dition, each sub-category contains intrinsic vulnerability patterns, e.g., while
Ad libraries mainly contributed to the ID-GLOB and WV-RCEV, SNS libraries
mainly contributed to WV-SSLV and WV-DOMS.
6.2.3 Price vs. vulnerabilities
Figure 9 shows a correlation between the prices of paid apps and the numbers of
total vulnerabilities that originated from libraries. Interestingly, more expensive
apps tend to have more vulnerabilities, both in total and unique counts. In addi-
tion, top apps tend to have more vulnerabilities than random apps. This finding
17
Official Private Third Party Official Private Third Party
Free Top Free Random
Paid Top Paid Random
*ID-GLOB
ID-STOK
*ID-FGMT
CR-KSPW
*CR-KSHC
*CR-SSLV
CR-CERT
CR-ECBM
CR-PKEY
IC-CPRV
IC-SRVC
IC-DNGR
IC-EXPT
IC-DEBG
*WV-SSLV
*WV-RCEV
WV-FSYS
WV-DOMS
*ID-GLOB
ID-STOK
*ID-FGMT
CR-KSPW
*CR-KSHC
*CR-SSLV
CR-CERT
CR-ECBM
CR-PKEY
IC-CPRV
IC-SRVC
IC-DNGR
IC-EXPT
IC-DEBG
*WV-SSLV
*WV-RCEV
WV-FSYS
WV-DOMS
*ID-GLOB
ID-STOK
*ID-FGMT
CR-KSPW
*CR-KSHC
*CR-SSLV
CR-CERT
CR-ECBM
CR-PKEY
IC-CPRV
IC-SRVC
IC-DNGR
IC-EXPT
IC-DEBG
*WV-SSLV
*WV-RCEV
WV-FSYS
WV-DOMS
D
e
v
S
N
S
C
lo
u
d
B
u
il
d
A
d
A
n
a
ly
t
P
y
m
t
G
a
m
e
Free Top Free Random
Paid Top Paid Random
D
e
v
S
N
S
C
lo
u
d
B
u
il
d
A
d
A
n
a
ly
t
P
y
m
t
G
a
m
e
*ID-GLOB
ID-STOK
*ID-FGMT
CR-KSPW
*CR-KSHC
*CR-SSLV
CR-CERT
CR-ECBM
CR-PKEY
IC-CPRV
IC-SRVC
IC-DNGR
IC-EXPT
IC-DEBG
*WV-SSLV
*WV-RCEV
WV-FSYS
WV-DOMS
Figure 8: Relationship between library categories (top) / sub-categories (bot-
tom) and vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities shown with bold fonts in Table 10 are
marked with asterisk.
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Figure 9: The prices of apps vs. the number of vulnerabilities associated with
the libraries in the apps.
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Figure 10: The number of Java classes vs. the number of vulnerabilities.
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Figure 11: Statistics of apps over time
can be interpreted as follows. As shown in Fig. 6, more expensive/popular apps
tend to have more libraries. In addition, as Fig. 10 clearly shows, apps with a
higher number of classes, proportional to the number of libraries, tend to have
more vulnerabilities. Therefore, expensive/popular apps have more library code;
thus, they are more likely to have vulnerabilities.
The anomaly shown in Fig. 9, i.e., an app in the range of 50 USD, had 4,525
total vulnerabilities. We inspect this case in detail. The app was a digital book
application. The price of the app was 12 USD. All 4,525 detected vulnerabilities
were attributed to a single vulnerability1. Note that these 4,525 vulnerabilities
were found in the distinct 4,525 Java classes contained in the app. For each
page of the book, the app declares a unique class rather than introducing a
single generic class that represents a page. In other words, every time a user
turns a page of the book, the app calls a new class. To fix this vulnerability,
the developer must modify all 4,525 Java classes. Despite this rather poor code
implementation, it is ranked as a top paid app and had been installed more
than 10,000 times at the time of data collection.
In summary, even if an app is a paid app, it is likely to have vulnerabilities.
Somewhat paradoxically, more expensive/popular paid apps tend to have more
vulnerabilities. These results indicate that we cannot apply price-perceived qual-
ity heuristics when we appraise the quality of an app with respect to security.
6.3 Time-domain analysis
We examined how vulnerabilities in apps are addressed over time. Here, we
examine the status of the same apps with vulnerabilities six months after we
first acquired them, and we summarize the statistics of the apps (Fig. 11).
The percentage of apps removed from the marketplace in that period was less
than 9% for each category. The percentages of apps that were updated are
as follows: free (top): 59.0%, paid (top): 26.6%, free (random): 16.1%, and
1MODE WORLD READABLE OR MODE WORLD WRITEABLE which is classified as an information dis-
closure vulnerability
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paid (random): 8.5%. The update intervals of paid and random apps were
longer than that of free and top apps. We randomly acquired over one-half
of the updated apps in the four categories and confirmed which vulnerabilities
were fixed using Droid-V. The percentages of apps with fixed vulnerabilities
indicate the same update interval tendency, i.e., paid and random apps were
more difficult to fix than free and top apps. The percentages of apps whose
vulnerabilities were fixed completely are as follows: free (top): 18.5%, paid
(top): 6.4%, free (random):4.7%, and paid (random): 2.8%. Unfortunately, a
large proportion of apps were still vulnerable even six months after our initial
investigation.
Free apps are updated in a short period due to their monetization model,
i.e., updating an ad library to optimize advertising effectiveness. Therefore,
vulnerabilities in libraries are fixed when apps are updated. Ruiz et al. indicated
that ad libraries are frequently updated by advertising companies, and such
frequent app updates force developers to update their apps [35]. In contrast to
the above freemium monetization model, premium monetization of paid apps
results in less frequent updates. In addition, we assume that the effort spent
on product development for random apps is less than that of top apps, and this
results in infrequent updates for random apps.
The top three fixed vulnerabilities are CR-KSHC, IDSTOK, and WV-SSLV,
and there is little difference between free and paid apps. The first two arise from
the problem of hardcoded secret keys/tokens. WV-SSLV arises from problems
with SSL validation. The reasons why these vulnerabilities are more likely fixed
are as follows. First, CR-KSHC and ID-STOK are fairly easy to discover and
fix. For instance, a developer can simply obfuscate secret keys/tokens. Second,
since all these vulnerabilities pose a high risk to the integrity of server-side
services, developers have motivation to fix them.
6.4 Key findings and suggestions
Here, we summarize key findings derived from our extensive analyses.
• Roughly 70% of free apps with vulnerabilities were vulnerable due to libraries,
and Roughly 50% of paid apps with vulnerabilities were also vulnerable due to
libraries.
• Among the three library categories, third-party libraries were the main source
of vulnerabilities.
• While most vulnerable libraries originated from third-party libraries, a few
official libraries were also detected as vulnerable due to the use of old versions.
• Paid apps can contain vulnerabilities, and more expensive/popular paid apps
tend to have more vulnerabilities.
• Paid apps tend to have not been updated for longer periods than the free apps;
thus, vulnerable libraries in paid apps have not been updated for longer periods
than the free apps.
• Approximately one-half of the detected vulnerabilities were attributed to dead
code. We demonstrated that Droid-L can successfully exclude such cases from
analysis.
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These key findings enable us to derive clues to remediate vulnerabilities in
mobile app. We make the following suggestions to the stakeholders of mobile app
distribution ecosystems, i.e., mobile app developers, mobile OS developers, app
market operators, and mobile app library providers. We also offer a suggestion
for the developers of vulnerability test tools.
• Mobile app developers: Developers of apps with many classes/libraries
must pay more attention to their apps. They could apply vulnerability assess-
ment before release to at least eliminate easily-detectable vulnerabilities. After
the release of apps, they could also check the updates of libraries they use. As
we discuss in short, building a systematic update checking mechanism will be
useful.
• Mobile OS developers: Generally, infrequent updates lead to vulnerabili-
ties. For instance, some paid apps adopt the “sell-once-and-that’s-it” model.
For such apps, it may not be reasonable to expect developers to perform vul-
nerability assessment of their products. If a mobile OS provides an automated
mechanism that updates obsolete libraries/codes in an app, that could address
the vulnerabilities caused by outdated software.
• Mobile app market operators: Mobile app market operators should inspect
all active apps using systems like Droid-L and Droid-V. In addition, they should
provide vulnerability notification mechanisms that inform app developers of the
sources of detected vulnerabilities. It may also be effective to present ways to
update apps appropriately. Using systems like Droid-L and Droid-V, a mobile
app market operator can also inform users of the potential risks of an app.
• Mobile app library providers: By linking Droid-L and Droid-V outputs,
a list of libraries that contain vulnerabilities are generated. The results of our
analysis would be useful for library providers to quickly know about the vulner-
abilities and fix them.
• Vulnerability test developers: As reported, roughly one-half of vulnera-
bilities detected by existing vulnerability check tools reside in dead code. The
developers of such tools could implement a dead code checker to address this
issue.
7 Discussion
This section discusses the limitations of our analyses, user perception of security
risks, and ethical issues.
7.1 Limitations of the analyses
As discussed in Sections 3.3 and 4.2, both library detection and vulnerability
checking are based on static analysis approaches. We are aware of the limitations
and have described future work in previous sections. Another limitation we
did not discuss is apps with native code. While our analysis focuses only on
Java-written components, some Android apps contain both Java-written and
native code components written in C/C++. The use of native code components
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is especially popular in game apps, which are required to run as quickly as
possible. Afonso et al. mentioned that “Malicious apps can use native code to
hide malicious actions...” and surveyed how actual Android apps use native
code [4]. They revealed that most native code components are used to improve
CPU-intensive workloads, such as graphics and audio, while several hundred
apps out of 1.2M contain root exploits written in native code. However, their
work was not a vulnerability survey; thus, investigating vulnerabilities in native
code remains a challenge.
7.2 Ethics
We finally discuss three ethical issues.
Acquisition of paid apps: All paid apps used for our analyses originated
from the official Android marketplace, i.e., Google Play. We acquired all apps
from the official marketplace according to the legitimate payment procedure.
This means that we used our owned Google accounts to collect and purchase
apps one by one without violating the Acceptable Use Policy.
No additional harm: We conducted our app analysis in a test environment
without Internet accessibility. Therefore, there was no damage to the actual
apps, devices, and services.
Responsible disclosure: After finding new vulnerabilities in apps and li-
braries, we followed the principle of responsible disclosure and are now in the
process of reporting them to CSIRTs and app/library developers. The disclo-
sures will include the app and library names, the categories of vulnerability, and
the source code, as well as suggested guidelines to reduce insecure code.
8 Related Work
8.1 Library analysis
A significant amount of recent research has shed light on code provenance, which
means identifying different components of an application, e.g., host apps and
libraries and their developers [12, 29]. These studies tackled the negative effects
of a library and host app running without isolation with the same privileges. Li
et al. indicated that piggybacked apps with a library containing malicious code
can mislead security analysis [24]. Bhoraskar et al. also mentioned that a host
app as a whole can become vulnerable if there are bugs in the library [9].
Libraries play a vital role in improving the efficiency of developing applica-
tions and monetization (especially with ad libraries). As of 2012, 95% of popular
free Android apps contained at least one known ad library [21]. Unfortunately,
several studies have revealed the risk of an ad library automatically harvesting
privacy-sensitive data without sufficient explanation to users [38, 21]. Andow et
al. analyzed popular ad libraries and identified 15 libraries as madware, which
exhibits aggressive advertising behaviors [5]. Chen et al. addressed the prob-
lem of a potentially harmful library (PhaLib), which is potentially harmful code
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implemented as a library, and their developed tool for finding specific code over
different mobile platforms (Android and iOS) discovered 117 Android PhaLibs
and 46 iOS libraries [12]. To estimate the risk of information leakage, Demetriou
et al. developed a tool to discover apps that expose a targeted user’s privacy
data to an integrated ad library [13].
Although many studies of software libraries aimed to discover malicious code,
the motivation of our work is discovering vulnerabilities in libraries. To the best
of our knowledge, our library analysis is the first work to classify libraries into
three intrinsic categories, i.e., official, private, and third-party. This fine-grained
library analysis helps app/library developers clarify the boundaries of respon-
sibility for countering vulnerabilities and appropriate triage countermeasures.
Backes et al. developed a library detection method called LibScout [8]. Lib-
Scout is resilient against common code obfuscations and capable of pinpointing
exact library versions. As we demonstrated in Section 3.1.1, the accuracy of
Droid-L is high, however, we can also use these techniques as a complementary
to the outputs of Droid-L.
8.2 Vulnerability analysis
There have been numerous studies related to vulnerability and malware/adware
detection. Many of these studies applied their methods to actual apps for evalu-
ation. Based on studies that consider vulnerabilities and threats to mobile apps
and devices, we classify such vulnerabilities into four categories, i.e., informa-
tion disclosure, SSL/TLS and cryptography, inter-component communication,
and WebView. The first two are broad underlying issues that are not solely
related to mobile apps and devices. The last two are mobile app/device-specific
issues.
Information disclosure: Apps should be able to carefully process sensitive
information, such as credentials; otherwise, there is a risk of information dis-
closure when broadcasting, logging, storing sensitive information, and setting
improper file permissions. Viennot et al. conducted a survey on secret tokens for
authentication embedded in app code [39]. Our Secret Token Finder (Section 4)
also finds secret tokens.
SSL/TLS and cryptography: Misuse of SSL/TLS and immature implemen-
tation of original cryptography can easily cause serious risks due to insecure
communication. Fahl et al. developed Mallodroid to find apps that misuse
SSL/TLS APIs, which can result in man-in-the-middle attacks [16]. We also
used MalloDroid to find apps that misuse SSL/TLS (Section 4). In addition to
issues with secure communication, we have addressed weak keys used for APK
certificates. Weak keys can potentially be cracked to obtain a private key, which
enables the forging of a signature on a modified APK [10]. Our Weak Certificate
Checker discovers cryptographically weak certificates used to sign an APK file
(Section 4).
Inter-Component Communication (ICC): ICC allows individual app compo-
nents to be independent and enables communication between app components.
Felt et al. addressed the permission re-delegation problem, which occurs when
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an app with permissions performs a privileged task for an app without permis-
sions [18].
WebView: WebView1 is an Android class that provides the functionalities of
a custom WebKit browser to render web pages. Jin et al. revealed a new form
of code injection attack using addJavascriptInterface, which is provided by
WebView and allows an app to add a bridge between JavaScript and native Java
code [23]. Mutchler et al. analyzed a large number of mobile web apps embedded
with WebView in terms of unsafe and leaky use of browser functionality. They
found that 28% of the apps contained at least one security vulnerability [33].
Our investigation of vulnerabilities (Section 4) for leveraging both original
tools (Weak Certificate Checker and Secret Token Finder) and free tools (An-
droBugs, MalloDroid, and QARK) broadly covered the above four categories.
While AndroBugs finds various types of vulnerabilities across the four cate-
gories, other tools find different vulnerabilities that are beyond the scope of
AndroBugs.
8.3 Paid app survey at market scale
A recent survey effort conducted by Martin et al. [31] reported that the first
research into the mobile marketplaces began in 2010, and, as of the end of 2015,
155 papers have been published.
In 2012, Chakradeo et al. collected 36,710 apps from Google Play and third-
party marketplaces, and they proposed lightweight triage techniques for market
scale analysis in 2013 [11]. In 2014, Viennot et al. presented a detailed crawler
architecture to acquire apps from Google Play in a scalable manner and compiled
metadata corresponding to over 1.1M apps, where they downloaded free apps
and the metadata of free and paid apps [39].
Although the scale of the analyzed data dramatically increases year-by-year
with the exponential growth of marketplaces, the analysis of mobile apps was
primarily performed in the above representative market-scale studies, except
for paid apps. The total number of apps available on Google Play was approx-
imately 2 million, and approximately 10% of these apps were paid apps as of
February 2016 [7]. Although the current market share of paid apps should be
considerable and paid apps serve an important role in monetization in mar-
ketplaces, in most studies conducted at the market scale, only free apps were
examined. Thus, the insights obtained from such studies were implicitly con-
fined to free apps. Therefore, the actual security aspects of paid apps have not
been considered adequately.
We investigated prior studies focusing on paid apps in terms of the number of
paid apps, the origin of apps (market), analyzed object, and analytical purpose
(Table 11). While most studies of paid apps covered a broad range of security
topics, the analyzed properties were only extracted from market-level metadata,
e.g., reviews, ratings, and the number of installs. This means that such studies
did not require the actual code of the apps. There have been conventional
1iOS also provides similar classes such as UIWebView and WKWebView.
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Table 11: Summary of works on paid app analysis from 2010 to 2015
Ref / Year # paid apps Market Object Analytical purpose
[17] / 2011 100 Google Code To detect overprivilege
[22] / 2012 2 Google Code To detect pirated apps
[19] / 2013 171,493 Google Metadata To understand preferences
[20] / 2013 1,223 Apple Metadata To infer rank-demand relationships
[15] / 2014 486 Apple Metadata To analyze review trends
[36] / 2015 234 Google Code To analyze location privacy
studies that analyze the code of paid apps; however, only several hundreds of
paid apps at most were analyzed. Our work achieves a double-digit increase in
dataset size compared to such studies. In addition, our work was accomplished
using both the code information of paid apps and market information. To the
best of our knowledge, this study is the first to successfully bridge the software
analysis of paid apps and market analysis at a large scale and successfully make
the security of paid apps understandable at a high level.
9 Summary
To establish the assessment and remediation of mobile app vulnerabilities, un-
derstanding their origins is an imperative approach. This study has focused
on mobile app libraries, which constitute most of the code in mobile apps. We
have attempted to understand the provenance of mobile app libraries that cause
vulnerabilities, which we have classified into four major classes, i.e., information
disclosure, SSL/cryptography, ICC, and WebView. By linking the outputs of
Droid-L and Droid-V, we can accurately specify the vulnerable libraries con-
tained in apps.
A unique and noteworthy approach of this study is that we used both free
and paid apps for our analysis. Since paid apps have different software develop-
ment and maintenance methods, compared to free apps, they exhibit a different
use of libraries or software update frequencies, and these differences affect the
characteristics of vulnerabilities in the apps. Our analyses using Droid-L and
Droid-V revealed that most vulnerabilities in mobile apps are caused by third-
party libraries. We also found that even top paid apps do have vulnerabilities
in their libraries, and many have not been updated. It was somewhat surpris-
ing that more expensive/popular paid apps tend to have more vulnerabilities.
Based on the findings derived through our extensive analysis, we have proposed
guidelines for mobile app developers, mobile OS developers, mobile app market
operators, mobile app library providers, and vulnerability test developers.
While this work addressed the fundamental research question: “how are the
vulnerabilities of mobile apps associated with libraries?”, we can further gener-
alize it to: “where do the vulnerabilities of mobile apps come from?”. There are
many research aspects that could address this question; e.g., the app develop-
ment environments, the economic models of mobile app ecosystems, the sources
of information for coding, and the reuse of code. An in-depth study of such
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research aspects is left for future work.
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A Deobfuscation
We first extract words that are separated with dots from a given package name.
If at least one of the words extracted is a single letter, we identify the package
name as obfuscated. For example, if the package name zzz.a.b.c is given, we
extract “zzz,” “a,” “b,” and “c” as words. Since the package name included
three single-letter components, we detect it as obfuscated and eliminate it from
the list of RPNs. Note that this simple rule may falsely eliminate legitimate
package names that include a single letter. However, we found that such cases
were not common in our datasets.
B Example RPNs
Examples of RPNs for each category and sub-category are listed in Table 12
and Table 13.
Table 12: Example RPNs in three categories of libraries
Category Example RPNs
Official android.support com.google.android
com.google.ads
Private kairo dubbeleCom
com.touchN
Third-party com.unity3d com.flurry
twitter4j org.apache.cordova
Table 13: Example RPNs in sub-categories of third-party libraries
Abbreviation Example RPNs
Ad com.inmobi com.chartboost
Analyt com.flurry com.crashlytics
Build com.adobe.air org.apache.cordova
Cloud com.andromo com.biznessapps
Dev bolts com.google.zxing
Game com.unity3d com.openfeint
Pymt com.prime31 com.paypal
SNS com.facebook twitter4j
C Dead code checker
Figure 12 presents the pseudo code of the dead code checker. For convenience,
let the term function include method, constructor execution, and field initializa-
tion; i.e., we trace not only method calls but also class initializations. The code
checks whether a given class is a dead code (true) or not (false). The algorithm
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uses depth-first search to search a function call tree. If it finds a path from the
given function to a class of ORIGIN (line 4), it concludes that the given class
is reachable, where ORIGIN is composed of three classes: Application, App
Components, and Layout. Application is a class that initiates an Android
app, and it is called when an app is launched. App Components are the essen-
tial building blocks that define the overall behavior of an Android app, includ-
ing Activities, Services, Content providers, and Broadcast receivers.
While the Application and App Components classes need to be specified in the
manifest file of an app, the Layout class does not. It is often used by ad libraries
to incorporate ads using an XML.
getf (Line 5) is a function that returns a list of methods that instantiate/call
a class. refFunctions (line 21) is a function that returns a list of functions
that reference the given function. As an implementation of refFunctions, we
adopted Androguard [14], which we modified for our purpose. If a function of a
class, say Foo, implements a function of the Android SDK class whose code is
not included in the APK, we cannot trace the path from the function in some
cases. To deal with such cases, we made a heuristic to trace the function that
calls the init-method of class Foo (lines 16–19). We note that the heuristics can
handle several cases such as async tasks, OS message handlers, or callbacks from
framework APIs such as onClick(). A method is callable if it is overridden in
a subclass or an implementation of the Android SDK and an instance of the
class is created. Async tasks, the OS message handler, or other callbacks im-
plement their function by overriding the methods of the Android SDK subclass.
Therefore, this should be handled by heuristics. Finally, if there are no paths
for which a given class can reach ORIGIN, the algorithm concludes that the class
is a dead code.
D Tools for vulnerability
checker
In the following, we summarize the five tools we used to test the vulnerabilities.
Also, Table 14 lists the vulnerabilities we tested and the tools used for testing.
AndroBugs [1] is an open source tool for scanning an app for a wide variety of
flaws. Its lightweight static analysis and non-requirement of source code suits
our needs well. AndroBugs has several detection levels, but we only adopted
the “Critical” level flaws, and in addition, we excluded those that are not vul-
nerabilities, such as bugs.
Secret Token Finder is a tool we developed to detect secret tokens present
in an app, in a way similar to how it is done in the work of PlayDrone [39].
Basically, it extracts all text strings in an APK file and searches for matches
with the regex patterns of IDs and secret tokens of known services. If such string
patterns are present in any of the strings, we marked the app as vulnerable. We
used regex patterns for AWS and Google OAuth tokens.
MalloDroid [3, 16] is an open-source tool for statically analyzing an APK
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  1:	  	  INPUT	  
	  2:	  	  c	  :	  a	  class	  
	  3:	  	  a	  :	  an	  applica-on	  (APK)	  
	  4:	  	  ORIGIN	  =	  	  [Applica-on,	  App	  Components,	  Layout]	   
 5:	  	  list	  =	  geG(c,a)	  	  #	  list	  of	  methods	  that	  instan.ate/call	  ‘c’.	  	  	  
	  6:	  	  done	  =	  []	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  #	  an	  empty	  list	  
	  7:	   
 8:	  	  WHILE	  list	  is	  not	  empty	  DO	  
	  9:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  f	  =	  list.pop()	  	  	  
10:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  IF	  f	  is	  in	  done:	  
11:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  con-nue	  
12:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ENDIF	  
13:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  IF	  f.parentClass	  is	  in	  ORIGIN:	  
14:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  RETURN	  False	  
15:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ENDIF	  
16:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  IF	  (f.parentClass	  inherits	  Android	  SDK)	  
17:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  AND	  (f	  is	  not	  init)	  	  
18:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  AND	  (f	  is	  not	  a	  sta-c	  method):	  
19:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  list.append(f.parentClass.init)	  
20:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ELSE	  IF	  (f	  is	  referenced):	  	  
21:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  list.append(f.refFunc-ons)	  
22:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ENDIF	  
23:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  done.append(f)	  
24:	  	  ENDWHILE	  
25:	  	  RETURN	  True	  	  	  
Figure 12: Pseudo code of dead code checker
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file for various potential SSL related security flaws, such as the inclusion of an
invalid SSL certificate or misuse in the SSL validation logic. We considered the
app vulnerable if at least one of the flaws was detected.
Weak Certificate Checker is a tool we implemented to find cryptographically
weak certificates used to sign an APK file. It does several checks, such as
whether a certificate was created with a key with less than 1,024 bits, or is
vulnerable to certain attacks, e.g., Wiener’s attack and common modulus attack.
We considered the app vulnerable if at least one of the flaws was detected.
QARK [27] is an open-source tool for analyzing vulnerabilities of Android
apps either in source code or packaged APKs. The tool automates the use of
multiple decompilers and combines their outputs to improve results. It covers
various security related Android application vulnerabilities such as the creation
of world-readable or world-writable files, activities that may leak data, private
keys embedded in the source code, apps that are debuggable, etc.
E The most popular libraries
Table 15 shows the most popular sub-categories of the detected third-party
libraries for each dataset. We see that some categories have the most popular
libraries in common, e.g., Facebook is the most popular SNS third-party library
across all the datasets. We also see some differences among the dataset. While
Apache Common was the most popular development aid library for the paid
apps, Google Gson was the most popular development aid library for the free
apps.
33
Table 14: List of checked vulnerabilities
Category ID CWE [32] Tools
Information Disclosure
ID-GLOB 264 AB
ID-STOK 522 STF
ID-FGMT 264 AB
SSL/TLS and Cryptography
CR-KSPW 522 AB,QA
CR-KSHC 295, 320, 798 AB,QA
CR-SSLV 295 MD,AB,QA
CR-CERT 310, 330 WCC,QA
CR-ECBM 326, 327 QA
CR-PKEY 312 QA
Inter-
Component
Communication
IC-CPRV 264, 926 AB
IC-SRVC 264, 285, 926 AB
IC-DNGR 264 AB
IC-EXPT 264, 926 AB
IC-DEBG 215 QA
WebView
WV-SSLV 295 AB
WV-RCEV 20, 264 AB
WV-FSYS 264 QA
WV-DOMS 264 QA
AB = AndroBugs, STF = Secret Token Finder,
MD = MalloDroid, WCC = Weak Certificate Checker, and QA = QARK
Table 15: Most popular categories of detected third-party libraries.
Free Free Paid Paid
Top-5k Rand-
10k
Top-5k Rand-
10k
Ad
Chart
Boost
StartApp Chart
Boost
Inmobi
Analyt Flurry Flurry Flurry Flurry
Build
Apache
Cordova
Apache
Cordova
Adobe
Air
Apache
Cordova
Cloud
App In-
ventor
App In-
ventor
App In-
ventor
App In-
ventor
Dev
Google
Gson
Google
Gson
Apache
Common
Apache
Common
Game Unity3D Unity3D Unity3D Unity3D
Pymt Prime31 Prime31 Prime31 Prime31
SNS Facebook Facebook Facebook Facebook
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